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Abstract  
Guidance regarding appropriate use of personal protective equipment (PPE) in hospitals is in 
constant flux as research into SARS COV-2 transmission continues to develop our 
understanding of the virus. The risk associated with procedures classed as ‘aerosol 
generating’ is a subject that is in constant debate. Current guidance is largely based on 
pragmatic and cautious logic, as the scientific evidence of aerosolization and transmission of 
respiratory viruses associated with procedures is scarce. The physical properties of aerosol 
particles which may contain viable virus, have implications for the safe use of PPE and 
infection control protocols. As elective work in the NHS is reinstated it is important that the 
implications associated with the possibility of airborne transmission of the virus in hospitals 
is more widely understood. This will facilitate appropriate use of PPE and help direct further 
research into the true risks of aerosolization during these procedures to allow safe 
streamlining of services for staff and patients. 
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Abstract  
Guidance regarding appropriate use of personal protective equipment (PPE) in hospitals is in 
constant flux as research into SARS COV-2 transmission continues to develop our 
understanding of the virus. The risk associated with procedures classed as ‘aerosol 
generating’ is a subject that is in constant debate. Current guidance is largely based on 
pragmatic and cautious logic, as the scientific evidence of aerosolization and transmission of 
respiratory viruses associated with procedures is scarce. The physical properties of aerosol 
particles which may contain viable virus, have implications for the safe use of PPE and 
infection control protocols. As elective work in the NHS is reinstated it is important that the 
implications associated with the possibility of airborne transmission of the virus in hospitals 
is more widely understood. This will facilitate appropriate use of PPE and help direct further 
research into the true risks of aerosolization during these procedures to allow safe 
streamlining of services for staff and patients. 
 
 
 
Key Points 
• Aerosols are particles that are smaller than droplets, and remain airborne for longer 
periods of time. 
• If aerosols contain viable virus, prolonged suspension will mean that the 
environment in which they were generated carries a risk of airborne transmission for 
an unknown length of time, and allows for deposition of the virus over a larger 
radius. 
• The definition of an aerosol generating procedure (AGP) is a procedure that 
generates aerosols over and above those generated during normal speech, coughing 
and sneezing, and is associated with increased risk of pathogen transmission to 
healthcare workers. 
• The evidence pertaining to the risk of aerosol generation, and transmission of viruses 
due to procedures that are classed as aerosol generating is scarce, therefore 
guidance is largely based on pragmatic and cautious logic. 
• Use of PPE and infection control measures, especially for prevention of airborne 
transmission, can create delays and barriers to care. 
• More research into risks of procedures currently classified as AGPs, especially in 
asymptomatic patients may help streamline future services. 
 
  
Introduction 
The prevalence of SARS CoV-2 continues to necessitate daily consideration of heightened 
infection control precautions for all healthcare workers (HCWs). Personal protective 
equipment (PPE) has been written about extensively in the media and medical journals. In 
particular, the concept of aerosol generating procedures (AGPs) and appropriate measures 
required to minimise associated transmission, is point of regular debate. 
 
As elective work is reinstated, risk management and appropriate PPE strategies require 
careful scrutiny. In addition, extrapolation from epidemiological modelling regarding a 
second spike in infection rates(Xu and Li 2020) necessitates readying the workforce for 
another period of redeployment and high volume contact with confirmed or suspected 
SARS-CoV-2 infection. It is important to have clear, effective infection control and PPE 
strategies. However, as understanding of the virus develops, the guidance regarding 
infection control practice is in a constant state of flux. For this reason, it is also imperative 
that the rationale behind practices is understood. 
 
Aerosol Generating Procedures (AGP) and airborne transmission 
Transmission of SARS CoV-2 occurs mainly via the droplet or contact route. Generation of 
aerosols, creates the possibility of airborne transmission. The WHO defines an AGP as “any 
medical and patient care procedure that results in the production of airborne particles 
(aerosols)”(WHO, 2014). However, breathing, speaking and coughing can generate aerosols 
from the respiratory tract( Yang et al 2007; Anfinrud et al 2020). Aerosolised particulates 
containing SARS CoV-2 RNA have been detected in hospital areas where no AGPs take 
place(Liu et al 2020) leading to speculation that airborne transmission may be possible 
outside hospital settings. The risk of airborne transmission may be increased significantly 
during the performance of ‘high risk AGPs’, namely “medical procedures that have been 
reported to be aerosol-generating and consistently associated with an increased risk of 
pathogen transmission”(World Health Organisation, 2014). A more helpful definition of an 
AGP might be; a procedure which are  ‘more likely to generate higher concentrations of 
infectious respiratory aerosols than coughing, sneezing, talking, or breathing’ and 
‘potentially put healthcare personnel and others at an increased risk for pathogen exposure 
and infection’ offered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2020) in the 
United States. 
 
Aerosols are generated by movement of air across the surface of a liquid. Increased force of 
air currents decreases the size of particles generated.(WHO, 2014) Procedures which result 
in high velocity airflow at the interface between air and the respiratory mucosa of infected 
patients, beyond that of a cough or sneeze, likely fulfil these criteria. It is of particular 
relevance to SARS CoV-2 transmission, as infected individuals accumulate high viral loads in 
upper airway secretions.(To et al 2020) 
 
The risk associated with AGPs rests on the behaviour of aerosolised particulates. An aerosol 
is a particle suspended in a gas that is small enough to remain airborne for long periods of 
time. By convention a cut off of 5 µm is often used, with particles of this diameter or smaller 
classed as aerosols(Tellier 2006). In contrast, droplets are particles of a critical size at or 
above which they settle on surfaces quickly. Particles of 10 µm diameter or more generally 
fall into this category. Between 5 and 10 µm particles behave as either aerosols or droplets 
depending on environmental factors(Kohanski et al 2020). The presence of infective 
aerosols increases the radius of air and surfaces around patients that should be considered 
contaminated. In an indoor environment, a 10 µm diameter particle will settle 1m in 5.6 
minutes, whereas a particle of 1 µm diameter settles 1 m in 9.3 hours(Kohanski et al 2020). 
The longer a particle remains airborne, the further it may travel from its origin. Particles 
behaving as droplets tend to settle within 1.5 to 2 m  of their origin, hence droplet 
precautions are required within 2 m of patients.(Tran et al 2012) The length of time prior to 
settling determines how long air remains contaminated, though this will be impacted by 
local ventilation and air currents. Particle size also affects deposition site within the 
respiratory tract. Particles of 5 µm or below generally deposit in the lower airways. Droplets 
larger than 10 µm are more likely to deposit in the upper airways.(Tellier 2006) The impact 
of anatomical point of deposition is not known. Theoretically, deposition lower in the 
respiratory tract could affect the type and severity of symptoms experienced. 
 
Which procedures are aerosol generating? 
Table 1 lists the procedures currently classed by Public Health England (PHE) as ‘aerosol 
generating procedures’. The absence of chest compressions during cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) from this list diverges from guidance issued by the Resuscitation Council 
UK, which classes it as an AGP (J Wyllie RCUK President, 2020). Data surrounding 
transmission risks associated with CPR are rife with confounding factors. It is not possible to 
separate the risks of different procedures performed during CPR, including tracheal 
intubation and manual ventilation. As such, guidance must be based on pragmatism and 
logic. The UK’s New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG) 
argues that during chest compressions, airflow through the patient’s respiratory tract will be 
akin to that of breathing, therefore should not be treated as an AGP.(PHE, 2020a) In fact, all 
procedures in the table 1 have varying, generally weak levels of evidence supporting their 
designation as aerosol generating. As such, advisory bodies must take a pragmatic and 
cautious approach. 
 
Intubation/extubation  
One study investigating particle sizes containing H1N1 RNA before and after intubation of 
infected patients, found increased particles of diameters that would be considered aerosols 
after intubation, though this was not statistically significant(Thompson et al 2013). Several 
small studies investigating transmission of SARS and other respiratory viruses to HCWs 
found a weak association with performance of intubation and infection. All point to 
confounding factors, including difficulty in confirming use of droplet PPE and contact 
precautions(NSS, 2020). During the SARS epidemic, a small study found HCWs involved in 
intubation showed higher rates of infection compared to controls.(Fowler et al 2004) Nurses 
involved in patient care during the peri-intubation period were at highest risk, raising the 
possibility that the risk to HCWs is increased by exposure to the critically ill patient and 
surroundings prior to intubation. This raises questions pertaining to the risk of intubation in 
asymptomatic, swab negative patients, requiring further investigation. Recent data suggests 
a low rate of infection with SARS CoV-2 in intensivists and anaesthetists undertaking 
endotracheal intubation(Cook 2020). It is not possible to conclude whether this reflects 
adequate PPE use during intubation, or that the risk during intubation has been overstated. 
 
Logically it is difficult to ascertain a mechanism of aerosol formation during tracheal 
intubation. There is little to no airflow in the respiratory tract of patients who have received 
neuromuscular blocking agents during the act of tube insertion. There may be increased risk 
associated with leaks during face mask ventilation. It is very difficult and not of particular 
use to separate the risk associated with these procedures, as it is rare to perform one 
without the other, especially in the critically ill. Interestingly, little to no literature exists 
about risk during extubation, which logically presents more opportunity for aerosolization. 
Extubation, like deep respiratory suction, can instigate forceful coughing. The removal of the 
endotracheal tube, if high flows continue through the circuit, will allow aerosolization of 
secretions deposited on the tube. 
 
Tracheostomy 
Insertion of tracheostomy during the SARS epidemic showed increased transmission risk to 
HCWs involved compared to controls(Tran et al 2012). No evidence specifically pertaining to 
the generation of aerosols during this procedure exists, however, the process will often 
involve bronchoscopy guidance creating a profound leak from the ventilation circuit distal to 
microbial filters. This would most likely be the source of aerosol generation. Disconnection 
while moving from endotracheal tube to tracheostomy also provides opportunity for aerosol 
generation. Tracheostomy change or removal in unparalysed patients usually involves 
suctioning and will cause forceful coughing which may generate aerosolised particles from 
upper airways and the tracheostomy site. 
 
Bronchoscopy 
There are few weak and contradictive air sampling studies investigating aerosolization 
during bronchoscopy (NSS, 2020). One study concluded bronchoscopy without delivery of 
nebulised medication did not generate more aerosols(O'Neil et al, 2017). However, a study 
of bronchoscopy focusing on influenza RNA, detected increased RNA containing aerosols, 
though this was underpowered(Thompson et al, 2013). In the absence of conclusive 
evidence, treating bronchoscopy as an AGP remains a sensible precaution. 
 
Non-invasive ventilation 
Both CPAP (continuous positive airway pressure) and BiPAP (Bilevel Positive airway 
pressure) use high flow gas to apply positive pressure via a tight-fitting mask or hood. Air 
inevitably leaks around the mask, especially when ill fitting, providing opportunity for 
aerosol dispersion. Evidence pertaining to the use of BiPAP during the SARS epidemic shows 
a weak association with infection in HCW (NSS, 2020), however, one particle sampling study 
concluded that there was no increase in aerosolisation when using BiPAP(Simonds et al, 
2010). Other studies investigating BiPAP delivery concur that it increases the radius of 
exhaled air dispersion, with higher inspiratory pressures further increasing the dispersion 
radius to up to 1 m ( Hui et al 2006; Hui et al 2014) These studies did not investigate particle 
size or number thus can only conclude that the aerosols generated by normal exhalation are 
spread over a wider area, not that there is increased aerosol generation. No studies specific 
to the delivery of CPAP were found on literature search. 
 
High Flow Nasal Oxygen (HFNO) 
Delivery of flows of up to 60 litres per minute can be achieved using HFNO devices. Mouth 
opening allows flow from this to be diverted out of the oral cavity, creating a mechanism for 
aerosol generation from the nasal passages and upper airways.(Kotoda et al 2020) Evidence 
of aerosol generation by HFNO is mainly based on in vitro studies(Kotoda et al 2020; Roberts 
2015). One in vivo study using patients with bacterial pneumonia, concluded that HFNO did 
not create greater airborne contamination in comparison to conventional oxygen 
therapy.(Leung et al 2019) However, bacterial and viral contamination are not directly 
comparable, and this was performed in an environment with 6 air changes per hour 
rendering the results difficult to apply to ward environments.  
A recent review concluded that evidence pertaining to smoke particle dispersion at HFNO of 
60 litres per minute was comparable to that of the use of oxygen masks at 15 litres per 
minute.(Li et al 2020) This investigated only particles <1 µm in diameter so again is not 
conclusive evidence of safety. It was, however, noted that the patient donning a surgical 
face mask in conjunction with HFNO can significantly reduce dispersion of bioaerosols and is 
worth considering as a risk reduction strategy. 
 
High speed cutting devices (post-mortem, surgery, dental) 
Multiple studies have concluded that high-speed cutting devices used in surgery and post-
mortems generate aerosols. Dental procedures using ultrasonic and sonic drilling also 
generate aerosols (NSS, 2020). If the aerosol source is the respiratory tract or upper airways, 
airborne PPE precautions should be worn. There are concerns regarding the possibility of 
infectivity of smoke plumes and gas released after laparoscopy(RCSEng. 2020a) but there is 
currently no evidence to support this. 
 
Airway suctioning 
The evidence base for risk associated with airways suctioning involves HCW infection rates 
during the SARS epidemic (NSS, 2020). These data pertain to the suctioning of intubated 
patients, and involve ventilator circuit disconnection, which is the logical source of 
aerosolization.  
 
Induction of sputum and nebulisation  
Multiple studies have concluded that chest physiotherapy is neither associated with an 
increased transmission of SARS nor increased aerosol particle detection(NSS, 2020). There is 
evidence that although nebulisation increases aerosol particle detection, these particles are 
generated from the nebuliser, not the patient, therefore would not pose an infection risk. 
Despite this, induction of sputum with nebulised saline remains classified as an AGP. 
Forceful and prolonged coughing will generate aerosols, although increased risk of 
transmission has not been demonstrated. Governing bodies are issuing precautionary 
guidance surrounding procedures that involve proximity to the airway of patients 
undergoing procedures that induce this. The Royal College of Surgeons has stated that 
nasogastric tube insertion, which often causes forceful coughing, should be considered an 
AGP (HPS, 2020). Furthermore, the Royal College of Speech and Language therapists asserts 
that procedures such as swallow assessment inducing forceful coughing, pose similar 
infection risks to induction of sputum using nebulised saline. (Bolton L et al, 2020) 
 
Personal protective equipment 
Current PPE guidance falls into two categories, droplet precautions, required within 2 m of 
patients, and airborne precautions required where AGPs are performed. Droplet 
precautions include sessional use of fluid resistant surgical masks and eye protection, single 
use gloves and plastic aprons. Patients should also wear a fluid resistant surgical mask, as 
the mechanism of risk reduction is mainly via reduction of droplet dispersal from the mask 
wearer (Rodriguez-Palacios et al 2020). 
 
Recommended PPE for environments with risk of aerosolisation include single use of 
filtering face piece respirator 3 (FFP3) masks, which should filter aerosolised particles at 
>99% efficiency, eye protection, long-sleeved fluid resistant gown, and gloves. Long-sleeved 
gowns are required as bioaerosols may contaminate larger surface areas of clothing. 
Transmission occurs when an HCW touches contaminated clothing then touches their 
mouth nose or eyes. The gown reduces this risk by removing contamination once contact 
with the high-risk environment is terminated. PHE guidance makes no mention of hair 
coverings, they are unlikely to afford extra protection in aerosolised environments as the 
microbiome on human hair should rapidly destroy viral particles settling on hair. (IPS, 2020) 
One important consideration regarding PPE use is identifying areas that are high risk and for 
how long these areas should be treated as containing aerosols, therefore requiring airborne 
PPE precautions, after AGP performance. Current guidance regarding timing of aerosol 
clearance after AGP is based on the number of air changes in the room. 5 air changes are 
sufficient to remove >99% of airborne contaminants. (RCSEng, 2020b) This guidance is 
simple to follow in controlled environments such as operating theatres or negative pressure 
rooms, where air exchange rates are controlled. Most operating theatres undergo 5 air 
change within 15 minutes after an AGP, rendering the room safe for HCWs to enter in 
droplet precaution PPE. However, little attention in the literature has been paid to remote 
areas where AGPs are performed less frequently. During surges, some areas such as 
resuscitation bays in the emergency department, can be cohorted with HCWs consistently 
wearing airborne precautions in these areas. As admissions for SARS CoV-2 infections 
decrease it is not viable to continue this practice. This creates issues when an AGP must be 
performed in an area such as this, or a ward area, where ventilation rates are unknown. 
How long these areas are contaminated with aerosols and the radius and timing of surface 
decontamination optimal for risk reduction, must be elucidated. 
 
Bearing this in mind, in ICU HCWs are required to wear airborne precaution PPE for all 
contact with potentially infected ventilated patients. This presumably is to ensure that in 
the event of accidental ventilator disconnection distal to the microbial filter, HCWs are still 
protected. It is of note that similar precautions are not required in operating theatres where 
patients are also on closed circuit ventilation. 
 
Problems posed by personal protective equipment and infection prevention and control 
strategies for anaesthesia and intensive care 
As specialties used to dealing with emergencies, intensivists and anaesthetists understand 
the importance of communication. One of the biggest challenges during the pandemic has 
been difficulties faced by HCWs in communicating while wearing PPE for AGPs. The 
deciphering of facial expressions and lip reading is rendered impossible while speech is 
muffled by tight-fitting masks and visors. The extra bandwidth occupied by fear of breaching 
PPE guidance, accompanied by discomfort and increased heat, makes normal working more 
physically and mentally demanding. This becomes compounded in emergency situations. 
Any safe reduction in PPE requirements could therefore be of benefit to patients and staff. 
 
Theatre turnover 
As elective surgical work is reintroduced, waiting lists are longer than ever, and increasing 
list turnover in theatres will be paramount in tackling the backlog. This may be hampered by 
IPC measures including the donning and doffing of PPE and the need for delays after each 
AGP, before HCWs can enter to commence surgery or decontaminate the area. This delay 
can be mitigated by staff wearing airborne precaution PPE for the entire theatre session, but 
the aforementioned disadvantages of PPE in team environments must be weighed against 
the time savings that could be made. 
 
Consensus guidance from Royal Colleges and PHE on August 20th 2020 downgraded 
operating theatres from a ‘high risk hotspot’. Airborne precaution PPE and delays for air 
changes are not required for AGPs in asymptomatic patients with a negative swab within 72 
hours of surgery(PHE, 2020b). However, it is not always possible to fulfil these guidelines, 
and if background rates of infection increase, precautions may be reinstated. Guidance 
suggests responsibility for this decision be left to individual hospitals(RCSEng, 2020b). It will 
be difficult for hospitals to make defensible decisions without increased mass testing to 
provide robust data about local SARS CoV-2 prevalence. 
 
Intensive care 
As ICUs cease providing care for SARS CoV-2 positive patients in cohorted areas, issues 
associated with isolation rooms requiring airborne precaution PPE become highlighted. 
These patients may be reviewed in person and examined less often, both by ICU physicians 
and other specialties, in attempt to reduce the use of PPE and minimise staff exposure. 
Meticulous communication between staff inside and outside of the room is required, and 
careful evaluation of the need for patient examination must be weighed against the risks of 
contamination and excessive PPE use. 
 
Conclusion and further research 
This analysis of the risks surrounding aerosol generation in hospitals highlights the paucity 
of evidence on which experts can base guidance. As services that were paused during the 
height of the first wave of SARS CoV-2 infection are reinstated, the safety of HCWs and 
patients is paramount. These considerations are sometimes at odds with each other, as PPE 
use creates issues regarding patient care and dealing with important backlogs in surgical 
work, which if left unchecked could risk lives. It is important that while patient pathways are 
redesigned, robust data is collected investigating the risks surrounding procedures believed 
to be aerosol generating. 
 
Tracking infection rates among healthcare professionals, and correlating this with PPE use, 
will identify inadequate PPE use and guidelines that are insufficient for HCW protection. If 
current guidance is adhered to correctly, however, these outcomes will be of no use in 
identifying overuse of PPE or if unnecessary delays in theatres are occurring. For the 
downgrading of PPE use in elective settings, two important areas of research are required. 
Robust evidence of ongoing SARS CoV-2 prevalence in local populations must be gathered 
using mass testing. In addition, air sampling studies in theatres, to understand the true risk 
of aerosolization during performance of procedures classed as aerosol generating, especially 
in asymptomatic patients, may help elucidate appropriate infection prevention strategies.  
  
Tables 
Table 1: list of procedures classed as aerosol generating as per Public Health England 
guidance August 2020 (PHE 2020b). 
Aerosol Generating Procedures 
Respiratory tract suctioning 
Bronchoscopy 
Manual ventilation 
Tracheal intubation and extubation 
Tracheotomy or tracheostomy procedures (insertion or removal) 
Upper ENT airway procedures that involve suctioning 
Upper gastro-intestinal endoscopy where there is open suctioning of the upper respiratory 
tract 
High speed cutting in surgery/post-mortem procedures if this involves the respiratory tract 
or paranasal sinuses 
Dental procedures using high speed devices such as ultrasonic scalers and high-speed drills 
Non-invasive ventilation (NIV); Bi-level Positive Airway Pressure Ventilation (BiPAP) and 
Continuous Positive Airway Pressure Ventilation (CPAP) 
High Frequency Oscillatory Ventilation (HFOV) 
Induction of sputum using nebulised saline 
High flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) 
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